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Abstract
In a Bewley model with endogenous price volatility, home ownership and mobility across
locations and jobs, we assess the contribution of financial constraints, housing illiquidities
and house price risk to home ownership over the life cycle. The model can explain the rise
in home ownership and fall in mobility over the life cycle. While some households rent due
to borrowing constraints in the mortgage market, factors that effect propensities to save and
move, such as risky house values and transactions costs, are more important determinants of
the ownership rate.
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1 Introduction
What accounts for the steep, upward life-cycle profile of home ownership in the United States?
There are several popular explanations: borrowing constraints in the mortgage market that prevent
young households from purchasing housing; the illiquidity of owner-occupied housing that makes
rental housing preferable for young, mobile households; and changes in the hedging motives of
households when housing is risky.
Each explanation has found supporting evidence in the data. Young households are more mo-
bile than older households: they are more likely to move to a new home (figure 4), to move to a
new U.S. state and to move for self-reported “job reasons” (figure 6). Similarly, young renters are
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more mobile than young owners (figure 5). Young households are also poorer, with lower wealth
and income, on average, than middle-aged households (figure 8).
There are many studies that find, individually, financial market constraints, changes in mobil-
ity (due to either changes in demographics, and career concerns) and risk to be significant factors
affecting the ownership choice decision. There is a large literature on credit constraints and its im-
pact on ownership choice. We quote Linneman et al. [1997], Haurin et al. [1996] and Zorn [1989]
as representative of this strand. Papers that focus on demographics or career concerns implic-
itly concern housing transaction costs, since changes in the former primarily affect the ownership
decision through a household’s expected duration of stay. Clark and Onaka [1993] and Quigley
and Weinberg [1977] find that changes is family size significantly affect housing consumption and
the ownership choice of households. Cameron and Tracy [1997] emphasizes the effect of career
concerns on the mobility and ownership choice decisions of younger households.
There are at least several theories on the interplay between risk and home ownership. Davidoff
[2006] finds that households buy smaller homes when their income is more correlated with regional
house prices, indicating that renting may partial insure households against changes in their income
(since part of their income is correlated with local house prices and rents). Two potential reasons
why owning may provide insurance have been mooted. Sinai and Souleles [2005] explores how
changes in a household’s expected duration may affect its willingness to hedge against changes
in rental prices by owning. In their model, increases in expected duration of stay in a new home
increase the likelihood that a household owns because changes in the spot price of housing in-
stantaneously change rental prices, a fortiori, but an owner-occupier only capitalizes the resultant
change in the value of their housing stock when it sells in the future. Banks et al. [2010] and
Ortalo-Magne and Rady [2006] propose and find supporting evidence that households use home
ownership to insure themselves if there is a housing ladder (i.e. large houses are only available on
the owner-occupied market).
In this paper, we build a life cycle model that can explain the observed rise in home ownership
over the life cycle while also matching the fall in mobility and the rise in wealth over the life
cycle. The model, which features risky house values and borrowing constraints, encompasses
the above, popular explanations for home ownership. We are thus able to assess how important
savings motives (life cycle, precautionary and down payment accrual), hedging/insurance motives
and mobility concerns are to explaining why some working-age households rent while others own.
We find that while borrowing constraints in the mortgage market (henceforth, we refer to these
constraints as “the down payment constraint”) deter some households from owning, the inability
to borrow against future earnings together with the illiquidities in the owner-occupied housing
market are the most important reasons why many young households rent. In other words, house-
holds largely become home owners when they anticipate moving less often and when they want
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to start saving more. The ability to use a house to borrow against future income through negative
amortization is relatively more attractive to young households than simple lower down payment
requirements. We find little evidence that home ownership is a special source of insurance for
households.
Models of home ownership choices over the life cycle in general equilibrium (e.g. Gervais
[2002], Chambers et al. [2009b]) study incomplete markets settings in the tradition of Aiyagari
[1994] and Bewley [1984]. We build on these models by allowing for volatility in house prices,
changes in family sizes and choice of location. These additions are key to generating the ob-
served patterns of household mobility, without which there is no way to measure the importance
of housing illiquidity. Moreover volatility in prices is obviously necessary for generating hedging
motives.
To generate volatility and mobility, we situate a Bewley-type model of earnings shocks in
incomplete markets in a Lucas and Prescott [1971]-like island model of housing and labor markets.
Exogenous stochastic variation in the quality of the local labor market will create endogenous
household mobility and movements in house prices and rents. We calibrate the model to U.S. data
from before the recent housing boom and bust. We find that the relative value to the household
of owning versus renting depends primarily on their relative user costs, the household’s expected
horizon of stay in the house, the riskiness of housing equity and the transaction costs of buying
and selling a house. Households that expect to move soon, either for family or career (earnings
related) reasons, rent to avoid paying the high transaction costs for buying and selling a house.
Furthermore, because housing is risky, home owners optimally accrue equity in it and thus wealth.
Young households, which comprise most of the renters in the U.S., mostly do not wish to save and
are relatively mobile and so do not own.
In the estimated model’s equilibrium, younger households have a lower expected duration than
older households in their current home for four reasons. First, from a career perspective, the
benefits of moving to a location that offers a higher salary are greater when the household is
younger. Second, young households expect their wages to increase dramatically in the future,
but are unable to borrow against future income and smooth housing consumption over their life
cycle. So young households expect to move into larger houses in the future. Third, expected
future earnings comprise a larger part of a young household’s total wealth and are subject to large,
permanent shocks. Households that receive such shocks to their total wealth are likely to adjust
their housing consumption. So, young households expect to move in the (potentially near) future in
response to future permanent earnings shocks. Last, relative to middle-aged households, younger
households are also smaller but growing in size and thus inhabit smaller houses, making it cheaper
to move given the transaction costs.
Our contribution is on two fronts. On the quantitative front, we evaluate consumer behavior in
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the presence of housing and location choice using the baseline model. Despite the many reasons
to study home ownership1, there is little consensus on which determinants of the relative value
of owning versus renting offered are quantitatively meaningful. That is, while explanations like
borrowing constraints are known to explain why some households choose to rent, we do not know
whether it can explain why most renters choose to rent. We provide a dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium model which can measure the relative importance of several prominent theories.
In the consumer durables tradition of Grossman and Laroque [1990], Yao and Zhang [2005],
Li and Yao [2007], our model is rigged so that the household’s value function is homothetic.
Homothecity makes the household’s problem computationally tractable but at a cost. For one,
we are limited to using constant proportional income taxation and transaction costs, among other
modeling choices. For another, homothecity limits the scope for heterogeneity in discrete choices;
the “state-space” for household’s discrete choices is effectively one dimension smaller, which is the
reason it is computationally attractive but can potentially make it harder for the model to generate
sufficient within-age heterogeneity in home ownership choices. For instance, instead of wealth
and income separately influencing home ownership decisions, it is the wealth-to-income ratio that
helps determine it. We calibrate the model to fit macroeconomic moments and moments from panel
and cross-sectional data. Despite the challenges posed by homothecity, our model is successful in
replicating several key aspects of the home ownership and mobility profiles over the life cycle.
We conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to evaluate the relative impact of various
factors in the ownership choice decision. We find that households that are financing constrained
are as likely to adjust along the intensive margin versus extensive margin, as in Ortalo-Magne and
Rady [2006]; about as many first-time home buyers in the model choose to delay owning rather
than buy a smaller house when forced to make a down payment (23.6 and 27.8 percentage points,
respectively, in the general equilibrium counterfactual with no down payment requirement). Lower
down payment requirements lead to only small changes in the home ownership rate; consistent with
the findings in Chambers et al. [2009a], which models the mortgage market in greater detail than
here.
Moreover households also can also adjust along a margin novel to the literature: when down
payment requirements are high, they can choose to live in a location with lower house prices. As
such, we find that lowering the required down payment increases the dispersion across locations
of house prices. The intuition is as follows: households weigh the tradeoff of living in high pro-
ductivity locations with the high cost of housing in those locations, leading to limited2 positive
1Home ownership plays a key role in many studies of, among others, the response of consumption to changes in
housing wealth (Case et al. [2005], Campbell and Cocco [2007]), household portfolios (Flavin and Yamashita [2002]),
investment volatility (Fisher and Gervais [2007]), the regional mobility of households and the propensity to default
(Ferreira et al. [2010], Sterk [2010]), and house price dynamics (Ortalo-Magne and Rady [2006]).
2“limited” in part due to the transaction costs of moving and in part due to wealth effects
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assortive matching. Young households in particular sort strongly since they have relatively little
wealth. Credit constraints limit sorting: the inability to borrow against future earnings reduces a
wealth-poor but high ability household’s desire to move to expensive locations. When constraints
are partially relaxed, more young households want to live in productive locations pushing up the
price of housing in those locations and decreasing the price in low productivity locations.
Changes in the cost of mobility have large effects on home ownership patterns. When the
relative transaction costs of moving into rental and owner-occupied housing are equalized (in the
baseline, owner-occupied housing is much more costly), housing consumption and prices go up.
Home ownership also increases by about seven percentage points - roughly an order of magnitude
larger than the increase that occurs with no down payment. More young households become home
owners when there are changes in mobility costs rather than changes to down payment constraints.
Home ownership choices are as much about “settling down” (i.e. lower expected future mobility)
as “saving up” (i.e. being able to afford a down payment).
Young households would like to insure themselves against future labor earnings shocks; young
households that save anything do so for precautionary reasons. By buying a house with a mortgage,
a household is instead taking a leveraged position in an illiquid asset that is positively correlated
with its labor earnings. So, home equity is less useful than liquid wealth for precautionary savings
for young households - as Ejarque and Leth-Petersen [2009] finds. In our model with incomplete
markets, ceteris paribus, owner-occupiers will optimally hold more wealth than renters, in part for
insurance reasons. Reducing the riskiness of housing in a counterfactual economy leads to less
savings, lower down payments, more home ownership and higher interest rates - consistent with
the findings of Amior and Halket [2011] that less risky cities have higher home ownership rates
and higher loan-to-value ratios at origination. Households are not less likely to own when rental
prices are riskless, contrary to Sinai and Souleles [2005]. In other words, we find that many young
households rent because owning a home means accruing home equity and thus financial wealth
at a point in their life cycle where households would rather be borrowing against their future
earnings - as in Chen [2010], which finds that more liquid savings accounts (i.e. reducing social
security pensions) would increase home ownership. As a household’s intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution changes as it ages, so will its willingness to hold the extra precautionary savings
that owning compels and thus its willingness to own.
On the qualitative front, we extend the literature by endogenously incorporating location choice,
ownership and house price risk into a GE model of housing. Heterogeneous agent, incomplete-
market models with non-constant prices typically feature infinite dimensional state variables in the
agents’ decision problems, and thus afford only approximate solutions (as in, for instance, Krusell
and Smith Jr. [1998]). Our economy, which follows from a simpler setting in Halket [2011], has an
exact stationary equilibrium in which the price of housing in a location in equilibrium is dependent
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only on the location’s productivity. This allows us to characterize prices and allocations without
having to keep track of distributions over households on every island.
With recent advances in computing, many dynamic OLG models incorporate housing. The
issues addressed range from the ownership choice decision (Chambers et al. [2009b] and Diaz and
Luengo-Prado [2008]), the evolution of consumer debt (Scoccianti [2008]), portfolio choice in the
presence of housing (Cocco [2005], Yao and Zhang [2005]), and the consumption of durables over
the life cycle (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger [2004], Gruber and Martin [2003]). Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger [2004] argue that the hump-shaped pattern of durable consumption (of
which housing is a large part) is due to incentives to accrue collateral. In our model, the hump-
shape is due in part to borrowing constraints (and in part due to family size changes) and incentives
to accrue wealth, not collateral. Han [2008] builds a model where homeowners may choose to ac-
cumulate more housing in order to hedge against housing risks. Under the assumption of separable
utility, she provides conditions for when the hedging motive outweighs the household’s normal
disinclination to hold riskier assets (as in Rosen et al. [1984]). Our work expands on this contribu-
tion by adding the option of renting, and uses a general equilibrium framework without separable
utility.
In a sense, our model is a natural merging of three strands of the literature: home owner-
ship with stochastic prices; home ownership in life cycle, general equilibrium models; and spatial
models of working and housing. Cocco [2005], Yao and Zhang [2005] and Diaz and Luengo-
Prado [2008] each use partial equilibrium models where the price of housing is correlated with
household labor income. Chambers et al. [2009b], Scoccianti [2008], Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger [2004] and Gruber and Martin [2003] have GE models where the price of housing is con-
stant. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill [2010] uses an island model of renter-workers to examine the
changes in the spatial distribution of house prices and wages in the U.S., while Sterk [2010] uses
an island model of owner-workers to examine how falls in house prices can reduce mobility due
to mortgage lock in. Ortalo-Magne and Prat [2010] prices houses that differ spatially in an OLG
model where households choose their location at birth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model and section 3 dis-
cusses the calibration. Section 4 compares the model to the data. In section 5, we conduct counter
factual experiments to assess the importance of family size, down payment constraints and career
concerns in determining the ownership rate. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the defi-
nition of the competitive equilibrium. Further appendices containing a proof of the equilibrium’s
existence and details on the calibration and computation are available online at the corresponding
author’s website.
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2 Model
We consider an OLG island model of household consumption choice. There is a continuum of
measure 1 of households and islands each in the economy. Households are indexed by ι ∈ [0,1]
and islands are indexed by ε ∈ E ∈ [0,1].
Time is discrete and each period in the economy corresponds to one year in the data. House-
holds are born at age A = 21 and live at most to age T = 100. In every period, the household
survives to next period with probability, λ :A → [0,1], which is a function of the age of the head,
a ∈A = {A,A+1, ...,T}. We assume that λ (a) is not only the probability for a particular individ-
ual of survival, but also the deterministic fraction of households that survive until age a+1 having
already survived until age a. Each period, a measure µ1 = (1+
T
∑
κ=A
κ
∏
a=A
λ (a))−1 is born; so the
population of households in the economy is stationary.
2.1 Technology
There are two goods in the economy: a non-durable, globally available, consumption good and
a durable housing good. The housing good is island specific and in fixed and equal supply on
each island, H(ε) = H ∀ε ∈ E . Housing is “putty” within an island; households choose housing
h ∈H ≡ [0,h].
The consumption good is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, where
K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the stock of available efficiency labor units in the entire
economy. A consumption good produced can be consumed in that period, converted into capital
next period, K′, spent on government consumption, used to maintain the housing stock or used
up in transaction costs. Capital depreciates at rate δ . The aggregate resource constraint for the
consumption good is:
C+G+K′− (1−δ )K = L1−αKα
where C refers to consumption used for all purposes except investment in capital goods and gov-
ernment consumption, G.
2.2 Preferences
The household derives utility from housing and from the consumption good, which is the numeraire
good. Preferences are time-separable where β is the time discount factor. The instantaneous
utility function u(·, ·, ·) is a CRRA type with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over housing and the
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consumption good 3
u(c,h, f ) =
(( cS( f ))
1−σ ( hS( f ))
σ )1−γ
(1− γ)
where σ is the share of housing in the Cobb-Douglas aggregate and γ is the inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
The path for the family size adjustment factor4, S : F → R++, is a function of the household’s
family size in that period, f ∈F . A household’s family size follows a finite state Markov chain with
age-dependent transition probabilities given by the matrices pi f ( f ′| f ,a). Any time a household
under the age of 60 transitions from f > 1 to f ′ = 1, that household divorces, which forces it to
move from the house that it chose last period. In the case of divorce, the household must move
from its current house and pay the relevant moving and transaction costs5.
2.3 Labor productivity and job offers
Each island has a productivity, indexed6 by j, which follows a finite state Markov chain with state
space j ∈J ≡ {1, ...,J} and transition probabilities given by the matrix piJ( j′| j). Let ΠJ denote
the unique invariant measure associated with piJ .
Similarly each household has an ability, indexed by i, which follows a Markov chain with
state space i ∈ I ⊂ [−I, I] and transition probabilities given by the matrix piI(i′|i). The initial
realization of a newborn household’s ability is assumed to be drawn from the distribution ΠI for
all households.
Households are endowed with one unit of time per period. If a household chooses to move in
the current period, moving occupies θm units of time. All other time is supplied inelastically in the
labor market. A household’s effective labor supply in any period is the product of four elements
that depend on whether the household moves, the household’s age, the household’s ability, and the
productivity of the island on which it chooses to work:
l(a, f , i, j,1m) = (1−1mθm)li(a, f , i)l j( j)
3Piazzesi et al. [2007] finds an intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption in the
range of 1.04 to 1.25 using NIPA data. However, Davis and Ortalo-Magne [2011] finds that the expenditure share on
housing is constant across time and U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, consistent with the Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tion.
4Attanasio et al. [1999], Gourinchas and Parker [2002], Cagetti [2003] each let family size affect a household’s
discount factor. In Gourinchas and Parker [2002]’s model, the life cycle profile for family size is deterministic and
homogeneous across households of the same age. Attanasio et al. [1999], Cagetti [2003] let the profiles vary by
education. Browning and Lusardi [1996] have a stochastic process for family size (see their paper for more references).
5We could also allow for some loss of wealth in the case of divorce. However this would not change the results
materially.
6We will often say an “island has productivity j.”
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where li : A ×F ×I → R++, l j :J → R++ are known functions and 1m is a dummy variable
which equals 1 if the household moves in the current period and is 0 otherwise. l j(·) is assumed
without loss of generality to be an increasing function.
2.4 Assets and Prices
There exists a one-period, risk-free asset b which pays a net interest rate r. All firms and households
may borrow or lend at this rate. Households choose asset holdings from the set b′ ∈B ≡ [b,b]
subject to a collateral constraint.7 Wages per unit of effective labor supply are w. There is a
proportional income tax rate ty. The tax is levied on a household’s total net income from labor
earnings. We denote the after tax wage rate as w˜.
2.5 Institutional structure of the housing market
Housing is distinct from both the consumption good and the risk-free asset in the following ways:
housing enters the utility function, and at the same time is an asset. It is immovable and, for the
households, indivisible. The transaction cost for households for buying a house is a proportion θh
of the purchased house value.
Housing may be either rented or bought from a risk-neutral, competitive agency in the real
estate industry. If rented, a household pays q( j)8 per unit of housing h on island ε of productivity
j. The household can buy and sell housing on island ε of productivity j at the price p( j). In turn,
every house sold by a household is bought by a real estate agency.
We assume that all houses require upkeep in consumption goods in an amount proportional
to the house value as maintenance: δh p( j)h. In addition, we assume that this keeps the house at
a constant quality over time. Owner-occupiers and landlords must pay a property tax, tp, on the
value of the house (assessed each period).
A household cannot rent housing that it owns9 but does not use and it can only consume housing
on the island on which it works. A household cannot simultaneously consume owner-occupied and
rental housing and cannot short-sell housing.
Housing is the sole form of collateral for households in the economy. We model this by giving
households a home equity line of credit.10 When purchasing a house, households can borrow up
to (1−d(a)) of the value of the house, where d(a) is the down payment constraint for a household
of age a. Thereafter, as long as they continue to be home owners, households may borrow up to
7We set b and h so that they do not affect the equilibrium.
8In the online appendix, we show that prices and rents on an island are only functions of the island’s productivity
in equilibrium.
9See Chambers et al. [2008] for a model with household landlords.
10We also call this a mortgage throughout.
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(1−d(a)) of the value of the house. They may also choose to roll over their debt after making an
interest payment. So a household’s borrowing constraint is:
b′ ≥min{−(1−d(a))τ ′p( j)h′,(1−1m)b},
where τ ′, ownership, is an indicator variable which equals one if the household chooses to own
in the period. This borrowing constraint is different from the more typical one which restricts
borrowing to be weakly less than some percentage of the house value (b′ ≥ −(1− d)τ ′p( j)h′).
With risky house prices, for a household near the typical borrowing constraint, a fall in the value
of a house results in a "call on the mortgage principal" - the household must reduce the amount
borrowed. If house price volatility is large enough, the effective down payment constraint (the
amount the household could borrow and still be able to repay in any state of the world next period)
may be much tighter than the actual (d).
If the household chooses to sell its house, it must pay off all existing debt, though another
loan can be taken out if another house is purchased. A household that does not have positive total
cash-in-hand (housing wealth plus financial wealth plus current income) will not be able to pay off
the mortgage it has (the debt it owes) on its house and will not choose to move in this period. We
do not allow the household to choose to default (see Jeske and Krueger [2005], Jeske et al. [2011]
for a models with mortgage default), but households can default implicitly by dying or becoming
divorced with negative net worth.11
Buying a home does not allow households to borrow against future earnings (unless d < 0). In
this respect, the lack of unsecured borrowing treats renters and owners equivalently.
Finally, we follow Gervais [2002] and assume that mortgage interest payments are tax-deductible
for households.
2.6 Real Estate Industry
Households have to buy, sell or rent housing through real estate firms. These firms are risk-neutral
and can borrow at the interest rate, r. The real estate industry is competitive, so the size and number
of individual firms is indeterminate.
Differences in the tax treatment of owner-occupied versus rental housing create a wedge be-
tween the user costs of owning and renting. Real estate firms pay income tax on any rental earn-
11The household has negative net worth if b ≤ −τ p( j)h(1− θh). In this case, the household will leave the house
with 0 wealth. We actually do allow for default in the computed model: a home owner can walk away from its house
at any time. However it will then lose all of its assets and a proportion of its earnings that period. We set the proportion
of lost earnings so that no one chooses to default in the calibrated economy. Without default and with Inada conditions
on utility and no consumption floor imposed, extremely low probability events had an outsized effect on household
choices.
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ings (as in Gervais [2002]), maintenance, interest and property taxes, and potentially earn capital
gains/losses from housing (which we assume that they carry forward). Since real estate is compet-
itive, firms make zero profit on average. The zero-profit condition is:12
(1− ty)q( j) = (δh+ tp+ r1+ r )p( j)−
1
1+ r
E(p( j′)− p( j)| j),
where ty is the income tax rate and E(p( j′)− p( j)| j) is the expected capital gain for a unit of
housing on an island of productivity j.
2.7 Birth and Death and the Government’s Budget Constraint
Newborn households are born with no housing and therefore their initial location is unimportant
(since they will pay the moving costs regardless). Their birth family state is determined by draw-
ing from a density ΠF : F → [0,1]. When households are born, they draw their initial wealth
from a distribution Πb, which is a probability distribution on B. The government collects taxes
and any accidental bequests by dead households, after making whole the financial sector on any
outstanding loans to dead households. Newborn households receive their initial wealth from the
government.13The remander of tax receipts funds government spending G which yields no direct
utility to households.
In summary, the benefits of renting are that there are no transaction costs and no downpayment
is required. The benefits of owning are the tax benefits: the user cost of owner-occupied housing
is lower, particularly if the household has a mortgage. In addition, due to the lack of complete
markets, there may be insurance benefits from either owning or renting.
2.8 Timing
The timing within a period is as follows:
1. Some households die. A household of age a enters the period, observes its ability i, family
size f , and its island’s productivity j, and accidental bequests b (if it is newborn, a = 1). All
of the dead households’ housing stock is sold to the real estate agency. Households that get
divorced sell their house.
12We allow households to move frictionlessly between rental houses of the same size on the same island, so that
renters are indifferent between their current house and any other rental of the same size and location if their rents are
equal.
13In the calibration section, we discuss howΠb is chosen to match certain aspects of the data. In our counterfactuals,
we assume that Πb remains the same as in the baseline. We leave to further research a joint examination of housing
policy, bequests and the wealth of young households.
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2. The household chooses to locate/work on island ε ′ which has productivity j˜. If the house-
hold moves, the household sells any housing τh and chooses home size h′ and how many
consumption goods c to consume this period and its ownership choice (rent or own), τ ′, and
next period’s financial assets b′. If it chooses to stay in its current housing, the household
only chooses c and b′.
3. Efficiency labor units and capital are supplied.
4. Factor payments are made, and consumption and housing services are consumed.
Information is public and all decisions are publicly observable.
2.9 Household’s Problem
The household’s problem can be split up into three parts14: the household’s problem where it
chooses whether to stay or move to a different location, and then a mover’s problem and a stayer’s
problem. The state variables of the model economy are: i, the idiosyncratic ability of the house-
hold; j, the island productivity; τ , an indicator which equals one if the ownership chose to own last
period; h, last period’s housing consumption; b, the household’s financial wealth; a, the age of the
household; f , the household’s family size; Id , an indicator for whether the household has received
a divorce shock; and ε , the island index.
The household’s problem is to choose whether to stay in its current house or move to a new
location, given its state and the value functions V s and V m (unless it has a divorce shock, in which
case it must move):
V (a, f , i, j,τ,h,b, Id ,ε)= (1−Id)max{V s(a, f , i, j,τ,h,b,ε),sup
j˜,ε ′
V m(a, f , i, j˜,bm,ε ′)}+Id sup
j˜,ε ′
V m(a,1, i, j˜,bm,ε ′)
s.t. bm = Id max{0,(1+ r˜)b+ p( j)hτ}+(1− Id)((1+ r˜)b+ p( j)hτ)
j˜ = j¯(ε ′) ε ′ ∈ E
r˜ =
r if b≥ 0(1− ty)r if b < 0
bm is the household’s wealth that it takes into the moving sub-problem, after selling any housing
it may own. If it receives a divorce shock, any net debt is assumed wiped out. j¯ is a stochastic
function which simple requires that a mover’s choice of island productivity, j˜, be consistent with
the productivity of the island it chooses to live on, ε ′.
14For an “all-in-one” version of the household’s problem, see the online appendix.
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2.10 Mover’s Problem
The problem of the mover is to choose consumption, house size and ownership, and savings, given
its age, family size, ability, location’s productivity, cash-in-hand, and location, subject to budget,
borrowing, and non-negativity constraints:
V m(a, f , i, j˜,bm,ε ′) = sup
c,h′,τ ′,b′
u(c,h′, f )+λ (a)βE[V (a+1, f , i′, j′,τ ′,h′,b′, I′d,ε
′)]
s.t. c+b′+h′((1− τ ′)q( j˜)+ τ ′p( j˜)(δh+ tp+1+θh))≤ bm+ w˜(1−θm)l(a, f , i, j˜)
b′ ≥−(1−d(a))p( j˜)τ ′h′
c≥ 0 h′ ≥H τ ′ ∈ {0,1}
2.11 Stayer’s Problem
The problem of the stayer is to choose consumption and savings, given its age, family size, ability,
location productivity, ownership, house size, assets and location, subject to budget, borrowing and
non-negativity constraints:
V s(a, f , i, j,τ,h,b,ε) = sup
c,b′
u(c,h,a)+λ (a)βE[V (a+1, f ′, i′, j′,τ,h,b′, I′d,ε)]
s.t.
c+(p( j)τ(δh+ tp)+q( j)(1− τ))h+b′ ≤ b(1+ r˜)+ w˜l(a, f , i, j)
b′ ≥min{(1−d(a))τhp( j),b}
c≥ 0
r˜ =
r if b≥ 0(1− ty)r if b < 0
2.12 Stationary competitive equilibrium
Appendix A defines a stationary competitive equilibrium for the economy. Since our model has
both discrete and continuous state variables the proof of existence of an equilibrium correspond-
ingly differs from the one in Aiyagari [1994]. In particular, aggregates (e.g. the aggregate supply
of capital through savings) are potentially correspondences and not functions of prices, and so
may be discontinuous - a point discussed at length in Chatterjee et al. [2007]. The proof is in an
online appendix and is an adaption of Halket [2011]. The equilibrium definition involves a selec-
tion of state-contingent action plans in areas of indifference using mixed allocations which serve
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as tie-breaking criteria. Since our economy is populated by a continuum of households, there is
no aggregate uncertainty using a mixed allocation. Areas of indifference are non-existent in our
computational solution and so mixed allocations play no role in our numerical results.
In equilibrium, island-specific house prices and rents are a deterministic function of the island-
specific productivity, j. Objects such as the distribution of wealth (as in Krusell and Smith Jr.
[1998]) on a particular island do not help forecast prices. This is due in part to the fact that house-
holds that choose to move in a given period are indifferent over islands with the same productivity.
This would not have been the case if moving costs varied by distance (i.e. higher costs for moving
to a different island than to moving within an island).
3 Calibration
3.1 Household life-cycle and preferences
The survival probability, λ (a), is taken from the National Center for Health Statistics, United
States Decennial Life Tables for 1989-1991. This table gives the mortality rate of the population
as measured in the 1990 Census. We use the life table for the whole population from 1989. We set
the retirement age to 66.
In the model, households evolve exogenously in terms of size and composition. We use the
PSID to estimate the transition matrices for family size. See the online appendix for details.
3.2 Initial wealth distribution
We calibrate the wealth distribution of newborns using the distribution of wealth among 21-25
year olds in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) waves from 1989-2001. We drop top-coded
observations, households with negative wealth and students from the sample and use the sample
weights provided by the SCF. We parametrize the initial wealth distribution as an exponential
distribution. That gives us one parameter that we have to match.
f (b0) = λwe−λwb0
where b0 is the initial wealth, and λw is the parameter to estimate in the exponential distribution.
We estimate λw by matching the mean of the initial wealth distribution.
λw =
1
b0
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This gives us λw = 0.00589. We convert the initial wealth distribution in the data to model terms
by scaling by the ratio of average labor earnings at age 21 in the model to average labor earnings
at age 21 in the data.
3.3 Technology
Following Cooley and Prescott [1995], we calibrate δ using the law of motion for the capital stock:
K′ = K(1− δ )+ I, where I is investment. In the steady state (adjusting for growth), the capital
stock remains constant and investment is used only to replace depreciated capital: δ = IK , We
calculate K from the Historical-cost Stock of Private Non-Residential Fixed Assets in the NIPA. I
is calculated from the Historical-cost Investment in Private Non-Residential Fixed Assets. We use
data from the period 1970−199315. δ is computed as the growth adjusted average of IK over this
period. This gives us δ = 0.13. We set the capital share of output, α , at 0.34.16
3.4 Housing
Analogous to capital depreciation, we calibrate housing depreciation using the law of motion of
housing capital. In the model we assume that housing supply is fixed and that home owners pay
a maintenance cost to replace depreciated housing capital. So, the (growth-adjusted) relationship
between housing depreciation and housing investment is
δh =
Ih−∆(pH)
pH
For the value of housing, pH, we use non-farm owner-occupied housing from NIPA’s Historical-
Cost Net Stock of Residual Fixed Assets table. Investment in housing is computed using non-farm
owner-occupied housing from NIPA’s Historical-cost Investment in Residential Fixed Assets. This
gives δh = 0.02. These values from NIPA are the value of the structures and do not include the
value of land.
These NIPA data focus on owner-occupiers, whereas there have been papers that stress the im-
portance of moral hazard in renter-occupied housing. Campbell and Cocco [2007] and Henderson
and Ioannides [1983] are two representatives of this literature. Further, Chambers et al. [2009b],
for instance, finds a depreciation rate of owner-occupied housing of 3.4%, and a depreciation rate
of tenant-occupied housing of 7.49% from their method-of-moments estimation process used to
15This period is chosen in part to remain consistent with our decision to look at the economy before the housing
boom-bust period circa 2001-2011 and also due to changes in the PSID after 1993 that would complicate extending
the sample period by just a few years.
16Heathcote et al. [2009] set the value of α at 0.33 after surveying the literature. Cooley and Prescott [1995] set
α = 0.4. Greenwood et al. [1995] set α = 0.29, which is followed by Gervais [2002].
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match, in part, data on home ownership rates. This suggests that the difference between the two
depreciation rates could be significantly different. In order to examine this difference, we use the
Current-cost Net Stock of Residential Fixed Assets and Current-cost Depreciation of Residential
Fixed Assets tables in the NIPA. The rate of depreciation of non-farm owner-occupied housing is
0.0143, and for tenant-occupied housing the rate of depreciation is 0.0164. These numbers suggest
that the two depreciation rates may in fact be quite similar. Since the model is homogeneous of
degree 1, we are free to normalize the price of housing on islands with the lowest productivity and
to arbitrarily set the housing stock on each island, H¯.
We use data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) on household’s loan-to-value ratios
(LTV) at origination to guide the calibration of the down payment constraint.17
Figure 1 plots the density of LTVs at origination for owner-occupiers. It is easy to see that
any absolute, exogenous borrowing constraint such as the one we have in our economy or the ones
in, e.g., Gervais [2002], Chambers et al. [2009b], Chen [2010], Diaz and Luengo-Prado [2008],
Fisher and Gervais [2011] is “reduced-form”. We set the down payment constraint to 10 percent,
d(a < 65) = .1. We do not allow retired households to take out new loans: d(a≥ 65) = 1. In the
calibrated equilibrium, this is sufficient to ensure that no one at age T has any debt.
Martin [2003] finds that the average monetary cost involved in a housing transaction is 7−11%.
We conservatively set the owner-occupied moving costs to θh = .08. As the effects of lower down
payment requirements and transaction costs are some of the main interests of this paper, we will
also compute economies with alternative values for these parameters in the counterfactual section
of the paper.
3.5 Taxes
There are two forms of taxes in the model economy - income tax, ty, and property tax, tp. Piketty
and Saez [2007] uses public use micro-files of tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service,
which have the advantage of being aggregated to the household level already. The income tax rate
we choose, ty = 0.2, is in the same range that they compute for the US economy18.
17We follow Amior and Halket [2011] in constructing the data. The sample for the estimation of LTVs is owner
occupiers, with mortgages, who purchased their home since 1975, and who took out a mortgage when they purchased
their home. The last condition ensures that we measure the loan and price in the same year, to calculate LTV. All
first and second mortgages at time of origination are used. The metropolitan survey covers 41 MSAs, and a further 6
MSAs (the largest) are included in the national survey. These surveys cover different MSAs in different waves, and we
therefore rely on four different waves to put together a complete sample: the metropolitan surveys of 1998, 2002 and
2004, and the national survey of 2003. We index observations by year of purchase (rather than survey year), because
we have information on the mortgage and home value (to calculate LTV) at the purchase year. Unfortunately, there is
a large amount of measurement error in the loan and house price variables: over 6% of observations in our data have
LTVs of over 1, with some reaching over 100,000. We exclude all observations with LTV greater than 1.
18See Table 1, page 6 in their paper
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We use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) 1990 5% sample for
the amount of property tax paid and the estimated value of the house.19 The weighted average of
the ratio of the amount of property tax paid to the estimated value of the house is 0.01 so we set
tp = 0.01.
3.6 The productivity process
Labor earnings are given by l(a, f , i, j)w, where w is the wage per efficiency unit of labor, and
l(a, f , i, j) is the number of efficiency units of labor supplied by a household of age a, family size
f , idiosyncratic ability i, and in a location of productivity j. We follow Storesletten et al. [2004]
and develop a model of labor earnings over the life cycle. The basic structure of the model is that
a household receives a base wage that is conditional on age, its idiosyncratic ability and location
of the household. We assume that a location’s productivity follows an AR(1) process and assume
that shocks to ability contain a permanent component only so that ability follows a random walk20.
Further, households are also born with a certain amount of ability, which we incorporate as a fixed
effect in the model. See the online appendix for details. Lastly, we assume that single households
earn only a proportion of their married counterparts.
Parameter Description Value
σ f Std. dev. of the fixed effect shock 0.5
σι Std. dev. of the persistent idiosyncratic shock 0.098
σ j Std. dev. of the regional productivity shock 0.026
ρi Persistence of the idiosyncratic shock 1
ρ j Persistence of the regional shock 0.9839
Table 1: Productivity parameters
Table 1 shows the estimated parameter values. We discretize the location productivity AR(1)
process following Tauchen [1986]. Due to computational constraints we pick a 5-point distribution.
Since the persistent idiosyncratic shock is a unit root process, we discretize its innovations with a
3-point distribution.
3.7 Setting macroeconomic variables
The remaining variables are r,w,σ ,β ,γ,θm. We normalize w = 1. We set γ = 3, within the typical
range of 2 to 5 (e.g. Piazzesi et al. [2007], Diaz and Luengo-Prado [2008]).
19We remove top-coded variables from the sample, and consider only owner-occupiers. Sample observations are
weighted using the household weights given in the data set.
20Though potentially important for the overall savings rate, we choose to not include a transitory component of
income for computational reasons.
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3.7.1 σ ,β and macroeconomic moments
Finally, we pick σ ,β ,θm so that the simulated economy matches the data in three moments: the
capital stock-output ratio (KY ), the share of housing expenditures in income for households under
65 , and the average moving rates of renters under the age of 65. We choose to focus primarily on
these younger households so that the choices of older household in our model do not greatly effect
our parameter values. See the online appendix for more details on our matching process.
The capital stock, K, is calculated using the Current-cost Stock of Net Fixed Assets table from
the NIPA. We set K to be equal to non-residential private and government fixed assets. Output,
Y , is computed from the Personal Consumption Expenditure table in the NIPA. We calculate Y
as personal consumption of non-durable goods + personal consumption of services + gross pri-
vate domestic investment + government consumption expenditure and gross investment - housing
services + services from durable consumption and find KY = 2.00.
Davis and Ortalo-Magne [2011] find a median expenditure share for working age households
of .24 across MSAs in United States. The average moving rates for renters and owners with ages
from 22 to 65 in our PSID sample is 22.3% and 9.7%, respectively.
The capital-output ratio also pins down the interest rate: r = .04. From our equilibrium, we get
that β = 1.00, σ = .25, and θm = .03. The expenditure share in the model is within the ±.02 the
confidence interval in Davis and Ortalo-Magne [2011].
Parameter Value Moment Data Model
β 1.00 KY 2.00 1.89
σ .25 Expenditure share .24 .25
θm .04 Renter moving rate 22.3% 23.0%
Table 2: Parameters calibrated internally
4 Comparing the model to the data
What aspects of a house help explain why home ownership increases over the early part of the
life cycle? We proceed in two steps to use the model to answer this question. In this section, we
show that the model matches many patterns found in the data. Then in section 5, we use a series
of partial and general equilibrium counterfactual experiments to see how home ownership choices
would change if one or more aspects of the household’s problem (e.g. removing the down payment
constraint) were changed.
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4.1 Ownership over the life cycle
Figure 2 shows the proportion of home ownership over the life cycle generated by the simulations
and from the data. The model economy generates a pattern of ownership over the life cycle that
is close to the actual economy. The overall home ownership rate for households under 65 in the
simulated economy is 62.6%, close to the data’s 72.5%21 Home ownership in the model starts
below the data and peaks above it but well below 100%.
Figure 3 plots home ownership by age and family size in the model and the data. To keep
things simple we plot two profiles for each: a profile for households with fewer than three family
members (“no kids”) and one with at least three members. We see that in both the model and the
data, the home ownership rate for larger families is higher than for smaller families, though again
both simulated profiles start below and rise above their data counterparts.
4.2 Moving
The model also matches the moving rates over of the life cycle (figure 4). This pattern in the model
arises because of two factors: firstly, renters are more mobile than owners and the proportion of
owners increases over the life cycle; secondly, mobility falls conditional on ownership as lifetime
earnings and family size uncertainty are resolved . The model is able to broadly match the data on
the average mobility conditional on ownership (figure 5), as well as the rates of decline in mobility
conditional on ownership.
In the model, we count “inter-state” movers as those households that move to an island of
a different productivity from the one on which they start the period. In figure 6, the calibrated
model and data both feature the same pattern of declining “state” moving rates over most of the
working-life. The level of “inter-state” moving in the model is higher than the data; higher than the
inter-state movers and job-related movers22. Many movers in the simulated economy also move
to a new island when they move. In the model, the moving costs of moving “next door” (i.e.
changing house size or tenure but not regional location) are the same as moving to a completely
new location. If there are enough different islands to choose from, nearly every household can find
a better “match” with an island that is different from the one that it comes into the period living
on. So, conditional on choosing to move to a new house, the household is likely to move to a
new island. Evidently, even with only five states for the island productivity process, l j, the set of
islands to choose from is comprehensive enough that many households can find a better match on
a different island should they choose to move. Including a cost of moving to a new island would
21These figures use the population weights in the model.
22Relocation would probably be better analyzed at the MSA or district level, but the lack of publicly available data
on those variables in the PSID precludes that possibility. The pattern of inter-state moving is closely related to the
pattern of career-related moving; the correlation between the two is .6.
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clearly help the model match the level of regional mobility seen in the data. However, including
such a cost would mean that house prices on any island would be a function of the distribution of
households (over the state space) on that island, seriously complicating the computational scale of
the model.
That said, locations are an important component in explaining the declines in general mobility
over the life cycle (both conditional and unconditional on tenure). The choice of location for
households is a trade-off between higher earnings due to higher productivity and higher house
prices and rental costs. Three factors play a significant role here. The steep slope of the base wage
in the early part of life (base wage peaks at around age 45) implies that middle aged households’
earnings change the most by moving to more productive locations. Secondly, since location and
idiosyncratic shocks are persistent, younger households have a larger expected future earnings
gain from relocating to more productive locations as they have a longer expected life span. Finally,
middle-aged households have more wealth and income and larger families and so tend to have
larger houses. This increases their housing cost, so that relocation is less desirable (ceteris paribus)
for middle-aged households.
Figure 7 shows the adjusted average idiosyncratic ability of households conditional on location
productivity as a function of age; an indirect measure of the urge to move for purely relocation
reasons. We scale each household’s ability by the cross-sectional standard deviation of the per-
manent idiosyncratic component for its age so that any spread in the adjusted average reflects the
effect of the complementarity between the idiosyncratic and island components. Evidently this
complementarity is stronger earlier in life as the spread in average ability is highest in these years,
when the expected life-span is high and the earnings stream is rising.
4.3 Wealth
Figure 8 shows the average household financial portfolio over the life cycle. We normalize the
simulated financial data so that the average net wealth23 of the simulated economy is equal to the
average net wealth observed in the data24. The net wealth and financial wealth of households over
the life cycle of the simulated economy matches closely the patterns in the data. The average house
value in the simulated economy rises over the life cycle, but not as far as it does in the data.
The average loan-to-value (LTV)25 in the model economy is 54%. Amior and Halket [2011]
find that the average LTV in the American Housing Survey is 78%. Since households in the model
cannot hold savings and mortgage debt simultaneously however, direct comparisons to this data are
23Financial wealth is any liquid savings or, negatively, debt. Net wealth is financial plus housing wealth.
24The average net wealth is calculated for the whole economy unconditional on age. Data are from the SCF as
described above.
25We compute the LTV in the model by taking the average ratio of debt to house value for a household at the time
of purchase conditional on having any debt.
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difficult. Still, 54% is indicative that many, particularly young, households are willing to borrow
significantly when they purchase a house.
5 Counterfactual experiments
In this section, we look at several prominent explanations for observed home ownership behavior:
that households do not own because they are financial constrained, that households do not own
when they expect to be relatively mobile, and finally that households own to hedge their exposure
to changes in rental prices. For each, we conduct several counterfactual experiments. Each experi-
ment comes in at least two flavors: a partial equilibrium version, where all prices are kept constant,
and a general equilibrium version where prices adjust26. The results presented are the steady states
for each counterfactual economy and should thus be thought of as the partial and total “derivatives”
(for the partial and general equilibrium versions, respectively) of some of the economy’s moments
with respect to various parameters.
5.1 The down payment constraint
Financial constraints are ameliorated by reducing the down payment required: d(a) = d< .1 ∀a<
65. We look at two settings: no down payment, d = 0; and a limited negative amortization, d =
−.1. Setting the down-payment constraint to zero (or less) does not eliminate financial constraints
(households still cannot explicitly borrow against expected future income), but is a way of relaxing
the financial constraint related to the housing market. Figure 9 displays the tenure curves for each
experiment against the baseline model and table 3 reports some summary statistics. As can be seen
there is no noticeable effect on prices (to the second decimal) when the down payment is lowered
to 0.
Counterfactual Ownership LTV r p(1) p(5)
Base 63.4% 54.1% 4.0% 1.00 1.27
d = 0 64.7% 58.6% 4.0% 1.00 1.27
d = 0 (GE) 64.2% 58.7% 4.0% 1.00 1.29
d =−.1 67.6% 57.7% 4.0% 1.00 1.27
d =−.1 (GE) 65.1% 59.6% 4.5% 0.95 1.28
Table 3: Selected effects from changes in minimum down payment
p(1) and p(5) refer to the price of housing on islands 1 (the lowest productivity) and 5 (the highest), respectively.
(GE) refers to the general equilibrium version of the counterfactual.
26We also adjust tax rates to balance the government budget constraint. We assume that the income tax is the tax
that adjusts. In all counterfactuals, the adjustments are slight and inconsequential to the results reported below.
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In general, home ownership becomes unequivocally more attractive when a lower down pay-
ment is required. Still, households can adjust to changes in the down payment constraint on either
the intensive or extensive margin. On the extensive margin, households that chose to rent because
they did not wish to save for a down payment can now own. On the intensive margin, relaxing the
constraint means that households can own larger houses and/or move to more expensive locations.
To observe these separate margins, we simulate a large number of households for their entire life
cycle in the baseline economy and in the counterfactuals, giving them the same shock values in
each economy. Table 4 reports some statistics from these households.
Counterfactual Earlier first home Diff in age Larger home
d = 0 21.1% 1.1 years 17.4%
d = 0 (GE) 23.6% 1.2 years 27.8%
d =−.1 30% 2.3 years 6.7%
d =−.1 (GE) 34.1% 2.4 years 27.6%
Table 4: Changes in first owned home
Earlier first home is the proportion of households that ever own that choose to own their first home earlier in
the counterfactual than in the base version of the economy. Diff in age is the average difference in the age that
households first become home owners. Larger home is the proportion of households that ever own that choose to
buy an at least 5
The average difference between the age at which households first own in the baseline economy
and the age of first ownership in the economy with no down payment is over one year. The
difference rises to over two years when negative amortizations are allowed. Though 20 to 30
percent of households choose to buy a home earlier when the down payment requirements change,
an equivalent percentage end up buying at the same age but opting for a significantly larger (at
least 5 percent larger) house instead. Evidently, some of the households that are down payment
constrained choose to delay their purchase27 of a house while others choose to buy a smaller
home.28 In other words, households adjust their housing purchases on both the extensive and
intensive margins.
As down payment requirements fall, young households sort better, increasing demand for hous-
ing on high productivity islands. Young households in particular weigh the tradeoff between higher
earnings on high productivity islands and cheaper housing on low productivity islands. Due to the
transaction costs of moving, the decision of where to live is a durable one. However the benefits
27There are, of course, a few households that end up buying later in the counterfactual economies. For example,
with no down payment needed to buy a house, younger households that anticipate buying no longer need to save as
much prior to the purchase and are thus (optimally) more exposed to shocks that may lead them away from their
planned purchase time.
28This trade-off is also discussed in the context of a 4-period model by Ortalo-Magne and Rady [2006]. In our
model, the housing choice spaceH is a continuous space and does not depend on whether the household chooses to
own or rent. Some models (e.g. Chambers et al. [2009b]) have a minimum house size for owner-occupied housing,
thus limiting the scope for adjustment along the intensive margin.
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of higher earnings (now and in the future) are lower when the household cannot borrow against
those future earnings to smooth consumption. Lower down payment requirements and especially
negative amortization let young households better access these benefits. So more high ability
households move to high productivity islands when down payments are lower, increasing demand
for housing on high productivity islands and decreasing it on low productivity islands.
5.1.1 General Equilibrium Effects
When the borrowing constraints are relaxed, demand for housing rises and by more on the high
productivity islands where more of the younger households live. At the same time, savings falls
since households no longer need to save as much in order to buy a house: LTVs rise by as much as
5 percentage points.
In the general equilibrium, negative amortization counterfactual, the fall in savings leads to an
increase in interest rates of 50 basis points. Higher interest rates imply higher rent-to-price ratios
and increases the tax incentive to own from mortgage deductibility. Better sorting implies that
demand goes up by more on high productivity islands. The net effect is that housing gets cheaper
to buy but not to rent on the low productivity islands and gets uniformly more expensive on high
productivity islands.
Lastly it is worth noting that household behavior and (in general equilibrium) prices change
by more when the down payment is lowered from d = 0 to d = −.1 than when it is lowered an
equal amount from d= .1 to d= 0. The reason is that young households are not keen savers. Their
expected earnings profiles are steeply upward sloping: from age 21 to their peak, earnings are
expected to about double. Even with a family size that is also expected to grow, young households,
absent risk, would strongly prefer to borrow in order to smooth their consumption over time. When
d = 0, households do not need to save in order to own, but neither are they able to use their home
as a “piggy-bank.” Net borrowing is only possible with negative amortization.
5.2 Mobility
In this section, we discuss several experiments designed to illustrate the response of home owner-
ship to changes in the costs of moving. In the first set of counterfactuals here, we eliminate the cost
of moving, θm = 0. In the second set, we eliminate the transaction cost for buying a home, θh = 0.
Table 5 and figure 10 display the results. These counterfactuals complement some counterfactuals
in Li and Yao [2007]. They look at the effect of house price changes on household behavior in
a partial equilibrium model with and without transaction costs for housing. In our case, prices
themselves will also respond to any change in transaction costs.
The effects from eliminating some mobility costs are straightforward. Eliminating either cost
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Counterfactual Ownership Size Own size Rent size r p(1) p(5)
Base 63.4% 1.00 1.07 0.90 4.0% 1.00 1.27
θh = 0 70.0% 1.12 1.24 0.85 4.0% 1.00 1.27
θh = 0 (GE) 70.2% 1.04 1.15 0.78 4.25% 1.05 1.33
θm = 0 61.5% 1.02 1.06 0.95 4.0% 1.00 1.27
θm = 0 (GE) 61.4% 1.02 1.06 0.95 4.0% 1.00 1.27
Table 5: Selected effects from changes in moving costs
p(1) and p(5) refer to the price of housing on islands 1 (the lowest productivity) and 5 (the highest), respectively.
(GE) refers to the general equilibrium version of the counterfactual. Size, Own size, and Rent size are the sizes of
the average house, average owner-occupied house and average rental house in the economy relative to the average
house size in the base economy.
makes households richer as transaction costs are deadweight losses. Households consume more
non-durables and live in bigger houses. Shifting the cost of moving, θm = 0, moves the relative
costs of moving from rental versus owner-occupied housing in favor of renting (which is now
costless to move from), lowering the home ownership rate. Eliminating the transaction cost of
buying a home raises the home ownership rate. Changes in θh shift consumption patterns more
and so prices change by more. Eliminating θh has about an order of magnitude larger effect on
home ownership rates than eliminating the down payment requirement.
5.3 Owning as a hedge
In this section, we provide an alternative test of the hypothesis in Sinai and Souleles [2005] that
some households own (those that expect to stay in a given location for long enough) as a hedge
against changes in the rental, spot price of housing. Sinai and Souleles [2005] test the hypothesis
by looking at how home ownership profiles across MSAs change as the volatility of their rents
change. Amior and Halket [2011] shows that across-city differences in price volatilities are closely
correlated to across-city differences in price levels, which can lead to bias in the reduced-from
approach in Sinai and Souleles [2005]. Using a partial-equilibrium model, Amior and Halket
[2011] finds that higher risk leads to more precautionary savings and thus lower LTV ratios at
origination and, if anything, lower home ownership rates.
In this section, we test the hedging hypothesis in a general equilibrium setting. Changes in
rental prices in the model are driven by changes in regional productivity. We present three coun-
terfactuals. In all three we use the baseline economy specification, including the relative island
productivities. The only thing that will change is the probabilities that islands change productivity
and, possibly, prices. In the first - labeled PE in figure 11 and table 6 - we take the baseline econ-
omy’s prices and rents and change only σ j = 0. So islands with the highest productivity in the PE
counterfactual have the same rents and prices as in the baseline case.
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In the second counterfactual - labeled PRE - we take the same specification but now allow
rents to change so that landlords make zero profits given prices and σ j = 0. However, the housing
markets are still not in equilibrium: demand does not equal supply. In the third counterfactual -
labeled GE - all prices can change.
Counterfactual Ownership LTV p(1) p(5) q(1) q(5)
Base 63.4% 54.1% 1.00 1.27 0.077 0.127
σe = 0 (PE) 64.8% 54.3% 1.00 1.27 0.077 0.127
σe = 0 (PRE) 60.6% 50.3% 1.00 1.27 0.086 0.109
σe = 0 (GE) 64.5% 57.4% 0.85 1.43 0.073 0.122
Table 6: Selected effects from changes in risk
p(1) and p(5) refer to the price of housing on islands 1 (the lowest productivity) and 5 (the highest), respectively.
q(1) and q(5) refer to the rental price of housing on islands 1 (the lowest productivity) and 5 (the highest),
respectively.
Reducing risk with no changes in prices or rents leads to higher home ownership and slightly
higher LTVs, consistent with the findings of Amior and Halket [2011] and counter to the hypothesis
that ownership is a peculiar source of insurance. However, given prices, rents are now misaligned:
rent-to-price ratios are now too low on low productivity islands. With σ j = 0, there are no capital
gains on any island, so price-to-rent ratios should be equal across islands. In PRE, only rents adjust
to equalize the price-to-rent ratios. In GE, both rents and prices can adjust.
When housing risk drops, housing demand rises, particularly on the higher productivity is-
lands where the risk is that prices fall when productivity falls. More households live on the high
productivity islands when there is less risk and buy bigger houses there as well. When only the
rents adjust (in PRE), rents fall on the higher islands and the higher demand for housing on the
high islands manifests itself primarily in the rental markets. When all prices are allowed to adjust,
however, home ownership rates and LTVs climb above the baseline economy’s.
Less risk leads to more home ownership and endogenously lower down payments when house-
holds do buy. When housing is risky, as it is in the baseline economy but not in these counterfac-
tuals, many households that purchase a house opt to save more than just the minimally required
down payment. The extra wealth held is extra precautionary savings. Households want to hold
some precautionary savings against changes in their earnings. If they hold this savings in home
equity, their precautionary savings is positively correlated with their earnings and therefore a less
effective form of insurance. In other words, households have to hold more wealth to achieve the
same amount of insurance when they hold that wealth in home equity. Reducing risk in the hous-
ing market thus makes owning more attractive to households and manifests itself in lower down
payments (higher LTVs) and high ownership rates.
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6 Conclusion
The illiquidity and immobility of housing and the inability to borrow against future income are at
least as important as housing affordability in determining the ownership choice of young house-
holds. Illiquidity and immobility make it expensive for households to move, particularly into and
out of owner-occupied housing. Factors that affect expected mobility and propensities to save play
a large role in determining ownership choices. Family size and career concerns, which are impor-
tant determinants of expected mobility and savings, significantly affect the ownership choice of the
household.
We construct a general equilibrium, over-lapping generations, incomplete markets (Bewley)
model. Our model incorporates risky assets (housing) in a general equilibrium where the house-
holds know the exact law of motion for prices. We use the model to measure the relative impor-
tance of career concerns, family size change and down payment constraints in determining the
home ownership rate over the life cycle.
We find that small portions of the population are down payment constrained and that more
households would like to use their house as a “piggy-bank.” Households do not use owning
as a hedge but instead frequently wait until uncertainties over family composition and earnings
prospects are lower before buying due to high transaction costs.
Our model abstracts from many potentially interesting features in the mortgage market. In
particular, households can not choose to default and the gross interest rate on mortgages is also the
risk-free rate that households can save at. Our guess is that if everything is publicly observable,
allowing for default and pricing that probability into the price of loans would reduce the role
the mortgage market plays in explaining the home ownership profile. Instead of having to raise
enough wealth to buy a home (as in our model), a household would have a second option: buy a
home with little wealth but pay a higher interest rate. Changes in the amount of wealth necessary
to obtain a low-priced loan would thus have smaller effects on ownership decisions: the home
ownership profile would be flatter, certeris paribus. If our guess is correct, our results - which find
relatively small effects from changes in down payment constraints - are biased in favor of finding
larger effects. We leave it to current and future work to examine whether changes to, for instance,
the assumptions concerning information may make the interaction between down payments and
default more important to home ownership rates.
Given the importance of expected duration in explaining the life cycle pattern of ownership,
interesting further investigations should include endogenous family sizes (along the lines of Fisher
and Gervais [2011]), a search model over job markets, and a deeper investigation into the choices
of older households and the role of housing in bequests of the elderly and the role of bequests in
housing purchases of the young.
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A Definition of Equilibrium
A.1 Mixed allocations and the distribution of households
Definition. The state space S = A ×F ×I ×J ×{0,1}×H ×B×{0,1}×E . A state can
be written as s = (a, f , i, j,τ,h,b, Id,ε) ∈ S . j : E →J is the function that maps an island to
its productivity. The vector of house prices is (p)J = (p1, ...pJ). The vector of rents is (q)J =
31
(q1, ...qJ). The price vector, −→p = ((p)J,(q)J,r,ω) ∈P ⊂ R2J+2. Y = {0,1}×H ×B×J ×
E ×C is the choice space. y = (τ ′,h′,b′, j˜,ε ′,c) ∈ Y is a particular choice vector.
SinceY ∈Rn, (Y ,B(Y )) is a measure space29 where B(Y ) is the standard Borel space onY .
We can then define the probability space, and a mixed allocation as an element of the probability
space.
Definition. Let Λ˜ be the set of probability measures on Y , with elements λ y : B(Y )→ [0,1]. Let
∆ be the space of functions f :S → Λ˜.
Now we can define a mixed allocation as a state-contingent distribution over optimal choices.
Definition. A mixed allocation, α :S ×P → Λ˜ is map that specifies the probability distribution
over the optimal choice set given by Y (s,−→p ).
α(s,−→p ) ∈ {α˜ ∈ Λ˜ : supp(α˜)⊆ Y (s,−→p )}
Let Λ be the space of mixed allocations. We will at times find it convenient to abuse notation
by referring to the value of the c.d.f given by α(s,−→p ) at a point y˜, λ y(y˜), as α(s,−→p , y˜).
In this paper we consider only stationary competitive equilibria. Before we define the equilib-
rium we set out the notion of the distribution of households over the state space. Our stationary
equilibrium requires that this distribution does not change over time.
Definition. The household distribution over states, µ : B(S )→ [0,1] is a probability measure on
S . LetM be the space of probability distributions onS .
A.2 Stationary competitive equilibrium
Definition. A stationary competitive equilibrium is a vector of strictly positive prices, ~p∗, a set of
correspondences
Y ∗(s;−→p ∗) = (H∗(s,−→p ∗),B∗(s,−→p ∗),τ∗(s,−→p ∗),J∗(s,−→p ∗),ε∗(s,−→p ∗),C∗(s,−→p )),
a mixed allocation α∗ ∈ Λ, a probability measure µ∗, firm capital and labor holdings K∗ and L∗,
government expenditures G∗, and a J∗(s;−→p ∗) such that:
(i) y∗ solves the household’s problem for each y∗ ∈ Y ∗(s,−→p )
29For a set X ⊆Rn, we assume that the standard Borel space is used in constructing measure and probability measure
spaces. That is, the statement “µ is a probability measure on X” implies that (X ,B(X),µ) is a probability measure
space.
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(ii) K∗ and L∗ solve the firm’s optimization problem:
r∗+δ = (
L∗
K∗
)1−α
w∗ = (
K∗
L∗
)α
(iii) Goods market clears:
(K∗)α(L∗)1−α = δK∗+G∗+
ˆ
S
ˆ
Y ∗(s,~p∗)
(c∗+1∗m(τ
∗h∗p∗( j∗)θh
+ p∗( j∗)h∗δh)dα∗(s,−→p ∗,y∗)dµ∗
(iv) Capital market clears:
K∗ =
ˆ
S
ˆ
Y ∗(s,−→p ∗)
(b∗+((1− ty)q∗( j∗)− (1+ tp+δh)p∗( j∗))(1− τ∗)h∗)dα∗(s,−→p ∗,y∗)dµ∗
(v) Labor market clears:
L∗ =
ˆ
S
ˆ
Y ∗(s,~p∗)
l(a, f , i, j∗,1∗m)dα
∗(s,−→p ∗,y∗)dµ∗(s)
(vi) Housing market clears:
H = H(ε) =
ˆ
S
ˆ
Y ∗(s,~p∗)
h∗ ·1{ε∗ = ε}dα∗(s,−→p ∗,y∗)dµ∗(s) ∀ε ∈ [0,1]
(vii) Government budget constraint holds:
G∗ = tyw∗L∗+
ˆ
s∈S
ˆ
y∗∈Y ∗(s,~p∗)
[h∗p∗( j∗)tp− ty(r∗b∗1∗b∗<0+ τ∗h∗q∗( j)) (1)
+
1−λ (a−1)
λ (a−1) ((1+ r
∗)b∗+ τ∗p∗( j∗)h∗)]dα∗(s,−→p ∗,y∗)dµ∗(s)−µ1
ˆ
B
bdΠb
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(viii) No arbitrage in the real estate sector:
(1− ty)q∗( j) = (δh+ tp+ r
∗
1+ r∗
)p∗( j)− 1
1+ r∗
E(p∗( j′)− p∗( j)| j), ∀ j ∈ J
(ix) Steady-state distribution:
µ∗ = ϒp,αµ∗
where ϒp,α is the transition function generated by the optimal choice correspondence of the house-
hold and the mixed allocation, α and 1∗b∗<0 is an indicator function which equals 1 if b
∗(s,y∗)< 0.
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Figure 1: Household Loan-to-Value ratios
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Figure 2: Home ownership: model and data
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Figure 5: Household moving conditional on ownership choice: model and data
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Figure 3: Home ownership by family size: model and data
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Figure 4: Household moving over the life cycle: model and data
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Figure 6: Inter-state moving over the life cycle: model and data
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Figure 7: Sorting across locations
Scaled average idiosyncratic ability over the life cycle by island productivity in the model. Island 1 has the lowest
productivity and Island 5 the highest. Average i is the average ability of households that choose to live on a given
island, conditional on age. The units are in standard deviations of the cross-sectional distibution of ability for each
age.
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Figure 8: Wealth over the life cycle: model and data
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Figure 9: Home ownership: down payment counterfactuals
38
21−25 31−35 41−45 51−55 61−65
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 H
om
e 
O
wn
er
s
 
 
Base
θh=0
θh=0 (GE)
θ
m
=0
θ
m
=0 (GE)
Figure 10: Home ownership: mobility counterfactuals
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Figure 11: Hedging counterfactuals
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